Ninth Amendment by Berger, Raoul
Cornell Law Review
Volume 66
Issue 1 November 1980 Article 1
Ninth Amendment
Raoul Berger
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Raoul Berger, Ninth Amendment, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1980)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol66/iss1/1
THE NINTH AMENDMENT
Raoul Bergert
The Forgotten Ninth Amnendment Bennett Patterson entitled his
little book in 1955,1 hardly anticipating that the amendment
would be invoked in more than a thousand cases 2 after Justice
Goldberg rescued it from obscurity 3 in his concurring opinion in
Griswold v. Connecticut,4 the 1965 contraceptive- case. Justice
Goldberg was not alone, being joined by Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Brennan; 5 in the opinion of the Court, Justice Douglas
included the ninth amendment among the provisions in the Bill
of Rights that have "penumbras formed by emanations from
[those] guarantees." 6 Thus inspired, litigants have invoked the
ninth to assert the inherent rights of schoolboys to wear long
hair,7 challenge school textbooks,8 prevent imprisonment in a
t Member, Illinois and District of Columbia bars. A.B. 1932, University of Cincinnati;
J.D. 1935, Northwestern University; LL.M. 1938, Harvard University; LL.D. 1975, Univer-
sity of Cincinnati; LL.D. 1978, University of Michigan.
I B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT (1955). One hundred thirty-two
pages are devoted to appendices and a reprint of the legislative history. Most of the 85-
page discussion is a hymn to "individual inherent rights," that are unenumerated and in-
dependent of constitutional grant.
2 A LExIs computer search in September, 1980 located 1,296 cases after 1965 from
the "General Federal" and "States" libraries. LEXIs is a registered trademark of Mead Data
Central, Inc.
' Prior to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court had few occasions to
probe the meaning of the ninth amendment. In United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75, 95 (1947), a case challenging the Hatch Act prohibition against political activities
by federal employees, the Court fleetingly referred to "the freedom of the civil servant
under the First, Ninth and Tenth Amendments," but held that they interposed no obstacle
to federal regulation where constitutional power is granted. Earlier, the Court had rejected
an appeal to the ninth amendment as a restraint on government action because it "does not
withdraw the rights which are expressly granted to the Federal Government." Ashwander
v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 330-31 (1936).
4 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
5 Justices Harlan and White separately concurred in the judgment. Id. at 499, 502.
Justices Black and Stewart dissented. Id. at 507, 527.
6 381 U.S. at 484. Justice Douglas did not win a plurality for his interpretation. And
he has since wavered. In Olff v. East Side Union High School Dist., 404 U.S. 1042, 1044
(1972), he dissented from a denial of certiorari in a case involving regulation of schoolboy
hairstyle, saying "[tjhe word 'liberty' [in the fourteenth amendment] ... includes at least
the fundamental rights 'retained by the people' under the Ninth Amendment." On the
other hand, concurring in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 210 (1973), in which the Court
found Georgia's abortion law unconstitutional, he declared that "[tihe Ninth Amendment
obviously does not create federally enforceable rights."
7 Freeman v. Flake, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972) (denial of certiorari) (although four circuits
upheld and four struck down regulations of schoolboy hair style).
8 Williams v. Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.W. Va. 1975).
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maximum security section, 9 protect against conscription,'0 im-
munize the transportation of lewd materials in interstate com-
merce,11 and claim a right to a healthful environment. 2
Justice Goldberg declared that "Etihe language and history of
the Ninth Amendment reveal that the Framers of the Constitution
believed that there are additional fundamental rights, protected
from governmental infringement, which exist alongside those
fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight con-
stitutional amendments." 13 Who is to protect undescribed rights?
Justice Goldberg would transform the ninth amendment into a
bottomless well in which the judiciary can dip for the formation of
undreamed of "rights" in their limitless discretion, a possibility the
Founders would have rejected out of hand. 4 And, as Professor
Robert Bork points out, an imputed authorization judicially "to
develop new individual rights ... correspondingly create[s] new
disabilities for democratic government;" 15 it disables the states
from governing in those areas. Whatever the meaning of the
ninth amendment, one thing it clearly did not contemplate-
encroachment on state control of local matters except as the con-
stitution otherwise authorized. It is undisputed that such a claim
had not been made by the Court in the more than 150 years since
the adoption of the Bill of Rights.1 6 Justice Stewart remarked in
his dissent that "to say that the Ninth Amendment has anything to
do with this case is to turn somersaults with history." 17
The ninth amendment provides that "[t]he enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people." 18 Paired with it is
the tenth: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." 19 The two are complemen-
Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970).
10 United States v. Uhl, 436 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1970).
11 United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
12 Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
'3 381 U.S. at 488 (emphasis added).
'4 See text accompanying notes 122, 125 infra.
15 Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q.
695, 697.
16 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 491 n.6 (Goldberg, J., concurring); id. at 520
(Black, J., dissenting); id. at 529-30 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 529.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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tary: the ninth deals with rights "retained by the people," the tenth
with powers "reserved" to the states or the people. As Madison
perceived, they are two sides of the same coin. During the debates
on ratification of the Bill of Rights in Virginia, he wrote to
Washington:
If a line can be drawn between the powers granted and the
rights retained, it would seem to be the same thing, whether
the latter be secured by declaring that they shall not be
abridged, or that the former shall not be extended. If no such
line can be drawn, a declaration in either form would amount
to nothing.20
Understanding of the ninth amendment is aided by apprecia-
tion of the background from which it emerged. The Founders
were deeply attached to their local governments: these were the
tried and true whereby they had resisted the impositions of royal
governors and judges.21 That attachment constituteda formida-
ble obstacle to the adoption of the Constitution; 22 there was wide-
spread distrust of the remote newcomer, a federal government
20 Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Dec. 5, 1789) reprinted in 5 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 432 (G. Hunt ed. 1904).
21 In his 1791 Philadelphia lectures, Justice James Wilson, who had been a leading
architect of the Constitution, explained that before the Revolution
the executive and the judicial powers of government ... were derived from ...
a foreign source ... [and] were directed to foreign purposes. Need we be sur-
prised, that they were objects of aversion and distrust? ... On the other hand,
our assemblies were chosen by ourselves: they were the guardians of our rights,
the objects of our confidence, and the anchor of our political hopes....
Even at this time [1791], people can scarcely devest themselves of those
opposite prepossessions....
But it is high time that we should chastise our prejudices.
J. WILSON, Of Government, in 1 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 292-93 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
22 Madison acknowledged this "habitual attachment of the people." 1 M. FARRAND, THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 284 (1911). It was condemned by
Gouverneur Morris: "State attachments, and State importance have been the bane of this
Country," id. at 530, but the current ran strongly the other way. See R. BERGER, CONGRESS
V. THE SUPREME COURT 260-64 (1969). It was to "state Governments", Oliver Ellsworth said
at the Convention, that he "turned his eyes ... for the preservation of his rights." I M.
FARRAND, supra, at 492. There, Elbridge Gerry asked, "[w]ill any man say that liberty will
be as safe in the hands of eighty or a hundred men taken from the whole continent, as in
the hands of two or three hundred taken from a single State?" 2 id. at 386. James Wilson
told the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention that "the framers of [the Constitution] were
particularly anxious ... to preserve the state governments unimpaired." 3 id. at 144. Madi-
son assured the Ratifiers that the jurisdiction of the proposed government "extends to
certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable
sovereignty over all other objects." THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison) 249 (Mod. Lib. ed.
1937).
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removed by vast distances from the governed, wherein large states
might outvote the small, and in which there would be clashing
sectional interests. 23  The measure of that distrust may be
gathered from the fact that after providing for "inferior" federal
courts, the First Congress committed the initial enforcement of
constitutional issues to the state courts,2 4 where it remained for
the next seventy-seven to eighty-six years. 25 Allied to this was in-
sistence on a government of limited powers arising from a pervasive
fear of "despotic government"; 26 hence the outcries against
unlimited power. As Jefferson said, "lilt is jealousy and not confi-
dence which prescribes limited constitutions to bind down those
whom we are obliged to trust with power."27
The drive for the Bill of Rights was fed by such distrust. At
the outset of the deliberations in the First Congress, Madison,
who drafted the proposed Bill of Rights, averred that "the abuse
of the powers of the General Government may be guarded
against in a more secure manner than is now done."2 8 Elbridge
Gerry alluded to the "great body of our constituents opposed to
the Constitution as it now stands, who are apprehensive of the
enormous powers of Government," and added, "[tihe ratification
of the Constitution in several States would never have taken place,
had they not been assured that the objections would have been
duly attended to by Congress." 29 Madison recalled to the House
that the proposed amendments were "most strenuously required
by the opponents to the constitution" in the state ratification con-
ventions. 30  A number of states accompanied their ratifications
23 R. BERGER. supra note 22, at 31-33.
24 Id. at 263, 273.
25 C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 3-4 (3d ed. 1976). Appeals
to the Supreme Court were not defended on the ground that the Court must be enabled to
rewrite state legislation, but because, in Hamilton's words, "Thirteen independent courts of
final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in govern-
ment from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed." THE FEDERALIST
No. 80 (A. Hamilton) 516 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). The password was "uniformity." R.
BERGER, supra note 22, at 272. Even so, there were those like Gerry who feared that "the
judicial department will be oppressive." 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 22, at 128.
26 H. ADAMS, JOHN RANDOLPH 38 (1882).
27 C. WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT 153 (1925). See
R. BERGER, supra note 22, at 13. See also H. ADAMS, supra note 26, at 8-14.
25 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 432 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1836) (printing bearing running title
"History of Congress").
29 Id. at 446-47.
30 Id. at 746. See also id. at 661 (remarks of Rep. Page).
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with proposed amendments. 3t Toward the close of the First Con-
gress Gerry said, "This declaration of rights, I take it, is intended
to secure the people against the mal-administration of the
[federal] Government." 32
Even stronger evidence that the Bill of Rights was to have no
application to the states is furnished by the fate of the first sen-
tence of Madison's fifth resolution: "No State shall violate the
equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the
trial by jury in criminal cases." 3 Madison explained that "every
Government should be disarmed of powers which trench upon
those particular rights.... [Tihe State Governments are as liable to
attack these invaluable privileges as the General Government is,
and therefore ought to be as cautiously guarded against." 31
When the clause came before the Committee of the Whole, Madi-
son urged that this provision was "the most valuable amendment
in the whole list," and that it was "equally necessary" that "these
essential rights" should be "secured against the State Govern-
ments." 35 As Professor Norman Redlich observed, "When Madi-
son intended an amendment to restrict the states in his proposal
to prevent the states from abridging free speech or press, he was
quite specific." 3 6 The clause was adopted by the House but re-
jected by the Senate, 37 underscoring that the Founders well knew
how to limit state authority, as is again evidenced by their refer-
ence in the tenth amendment to power not "prohibited by [the
Constitution] to the States."
The words "rights retained by the people" in the ninth
amendment expressed a political postulate explained by Jefferson:
"the purposes of society do not require a surrender of all our
rights to our ordinary governors," and it followed that there re-
31 See, e.g., 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADoP-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 657-63 (2d ed. 1876) (Virginia); cf. 2 id. at 542-46
(Pennsylvania); .2 id. at 177 (Massachusetts); 2 id. at 413-14 (New York).
32 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 28, at 749.
33 Id. at 435 (emphasis added).
31 Id. at 441 (emphasis added).
35 Id. at 755 (emphasis added).
36 Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights" ... Retained by the People?, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 787,
805 n.87 (1962).
'7 See Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431,
433-35 (1926). Redlich concluded, "It would be unrealistic to attribute to the Senate an
intent to impose ill-defined legally enforceable restraints on the states in light of this rejec-
tion." Redlich, supra note 36, at 806. Thus, the records of the First Congress confirm Chief
Justice Marshall's holding in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833),
that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states.
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mained reserved to the people an area of unsurrendered rights. 38
Opponents of a Bill of Rights had urged that it was unnecessary
because, as Washington wrote Lafayette, "the people evidently re-
tained every thing which they did not in express terms give up." 
39
In the words of Hamilton, quoted by Justice Goldberg, "why de-
clare that things shall not be done which there is no power to
do?" instancing "no power is given by which restrictions [on "lib-
erty of the press"] may be imposed." 40 Madison admitted that the
amendments "may be deemed unnecessary; but there can be no
harm in making such a declaration." 41 Thus viewed, the Bill of
Rights added nothing, 42 but was merely declaratory.
38 E. DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 145 (1957). See also G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 at 293-94 (1969). For Thomas Cooley, the ninth
amendment affirmed "the principle that constitutions are not made to create rights in the
people, but in recognition of, and in order to preserve them." T. COOLEY, THE GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 31-35 (2d ed.
1891). The ninth amendment "was an affirmation of the principle that, as rights in the
United States are not created by government, so they are not to be diminished by govern-
ment, unless by the appropriate exercise of an express power." Dunbar, James Madison and
the Ninth Amendment, 42 VA. L. REv. 627, 638 (1956).
39 29 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 478 (Fitzpatrick ed. 1939). In his letter to
LaFayette, Washington referred to James Wilson's assurance to the Pennsylvania Ratifica-
tion Convention that by the Constitution the citizens dispense "a part of their original
power in what manner and what proportion they think fit. They never part with the
whole; and they retain the right of recalling what they part with.... To every suggestion
concerning a bill of rights, the citizens of the United States may always say, WE reserve the
right to do what we please." 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 31, at 437.
C. C. Pinckney told the South Carolina House of Representatives that "by delegating
express powers, we certainly reserve to ourselves every power and right not mentioned." 3
M. FARRAND, supra note 22, at 256. In the First Congress, Rep. Hartley observed that "it
had been asserted in the convention of Pennsylvania, by the friends of the Constitution,
that all the rights and power that were not given to the Government were retained by the
States and the people thereof. This was also his own opinion." 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra
note 28, at 732.
40 381 U.S. at 489 n.4 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton) 558-59 (Mod.
Lib. ed. 1937)).
41 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 28, at 441.
42 Dumbauld justly sums up: "The Ninth Amendment was not intended to add any-
thing to the meaning of the remaining articles in the Constitution.... [It] was designed to
obviate the possibility of applying the maxim expressio unius exclusio alterius in interpreting
the Constitution. It was adopted in order to eliminate the grant of powers by implication."
E. DUMBAULD, sUpra note 38, at 63. Earlier, Justice Story wrote that the ninth amendment
"was manifestly introduced to prevent any perverse or ingenious misapplication of the
well-known maxim, that an affirmation in particular cases implies a negation in all others."
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1905 (5th ed.
1891). See also note 43 infra.
Parenthetically, this confutes those who argue that the rules of statutory construction
should not apply to interpretation of the Constitution, and those like Professor Dean Al-
fange, who ridicule the application of a canon of construction as an authoritative guide to
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Others, however, were deeply concerned by the effect of the
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius: what is expressed
excludes what is not.43 They feared that an enumeration of some
rights might deliver those not enumerated into the hands of the
federal government. Madison's response to such fears is quoted by
Justice Goldberg:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it
would disparage those rights which were not placed in that
enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those
rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned
into the hands of the General Government, and were con-
sequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments
I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights
into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I
have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last
clause of the fourth resolution [the ninth amendment]. 44
As Justice Black pointed out, "th[is] very material ... shows that
the Ninth Amendment was intended to protect against the idea
that 'by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power'
to the Federal Government, 'those rights which were not singled
out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General
Government." 45 Madison, in short, meant to bar the implication
that unenumerated rights were "assigned" to the federal govern-
ment, for enforcement or otherwise, returning to the theme he
had sounded at the outset: "[T]he great object in view is to limit
and qualify the powers of Government, by excepting out of the
grant of power those cases in which the Government ought not to act,
or to act only in a particular mode."46
constitutional interpretation. See Alfange, On Judicial Policymaking and Constitutional Change:
Another Look at the "Original Intent" Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 5 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 603, 618-19 (1978). See also Berger, "Government by Judiciary": Judge Gibbons Argument
Ad Hominem, 59 B.U. L. REv. 783, 805 (1977).
43 James Wilson assured the Pennsylvania Convention that "everything not expressly
mentioned will be presumed to be purposely omitted." 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 22, at
144. Chief Justice Thomas McKean also assured that Convention that congressional power,
being enumerated in the Constitution "and positively granted, can be no other than what
this positive grant conveys." 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 31, at 540. For a similar expression in
South Carolina by C. C. Pinckney, see 3 M. Farrand, supra note 22, at 256. Rep. Jackson of
Georgia alluded to the maxim in the First Congress. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 28, at
442.
44 381 U.S. at 489-90 (quoting I ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 28, at 439 (emphasis
added)).
45 Id. at 519 (Black, J., dissenting). See note 42 supra.
46 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 28, at 437 (emphasis added). Leslie Dunbar observes
that Madison "seems to have thought of rights under two main headings. One, as stipulat-
1980]
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Justice Goldberg neglected to turn "to the last clause of the
fourth resolution" in order to learn how Madison proposed that
the undesirable implication "niay be guarded against." That last
clause, the progenitor of the ninth amendment, provided:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in
favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to di-
minish the just importance of other rights retained by the
people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution;
but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted
merely for greater caution. 47
Madison's disclaimer of intention "to enlarge the powers dele-
gated by the constitution" by non-enumeration of "other rights"
and his emphasis upon enumeration as "actual limitations" on
such powers bars a construction which would endow the federal
government with the very powers that were denied. It is incon-
gruous, moreover, to read the text of the ninth amendment as
expanding federal powers at the very moment that the tenth was
reserving to the states or the people all "powers not dele-
gated." 48 Then too, because the federal government may not
"deny" unenumerated rights, it does not follow that it may enforce
them against the states.
In fact, enforcement was to be confined to expressly "stipu-
lated rights." "[Tihe great mass of the people who opposed [the
Constitution]," said Madison, "disliked it because it did not con-
tain effectual provisions against encroachments on particular
rights."' 49 Hence, Madison explained, if the Bill of Rights were
ing agreed upon methods by which in particular cases the government shall exercise its
powers.... Secondly, he thought of another class of rights as declarations of areas totally
outside the province of government." Dunbar, supra note 38, at 635 (emphasis added). Madi-
son's intention was "to define those fields into which powers do not extend at all." Id. at 636
(emphasis added). Even prior to Griswold, Justice Black concluded that the ninth amend-
ment merely "emphasize[d] the limited nature of the Federal Government." Black, The Bill
of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 871 (1960).
47 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 28, at 435 (emphasis added). On October 17, 1788,
Madison wrote to Jefferson that he favored a Bill of Rights "provided it be so formed as
not to imply powers not to be included in the enumeration." 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADI-
SON, supra note 20, at 271.
48 As the Court held in Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 587 (1840): "so far
from the states which insisted upon these amendments contemplating any restraint or limi-
tation by them on their own powers; the very cause which gave rise to them, was a strong
jealousy on their part of the power which they had granted in the Constitution."
" I ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 28, at 433 (emphasis added).
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incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of
justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guard-
ians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against
every assumption of power in the legislative or executive [not
the states]; they will be naturally led to resist every encroach-
ment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by
the declaration of rights. 50
For present purposes, the relevant provision of article 11,
section two, clause one, which enumerates the various categories of
federal court jurisdiction, is "all cases ... arising under this Con-
stitution." 5 1 A right "retained" by the people is not embodied in
the Constitution, and a suit brought on such a right does not
"arise" thereunder, as Madison made plain in stressing judicial
protection for "particular" rights "expressly stipulated." It does
violence to the historical record to construe the ninth amendment
to give the courts a roving commission to enforce a catalog of
unenumerated rights against the will of the states. 2 What the
Constitution expressed was the will of the people to reserve unto
themselves all powers not delegated and all unenumerated
rights, 3 a will likewise articulated in the article V provision for
amendment. With Leslie Dunbar, I would hold that the ninth
amendment "is an affirmation that rights exist independently of
government, that they constitute an area of no-power."5 4
How does Justice Goldberg meet these materials? On the one
hand he states, "I do not mean to imply that the Ninth Amend-
ment is applied against the States by the Fourteenth. Nor do I
mean to state that the Ninth Amendment constitutes an indepen-
dent source of rights protected from infringement by either the
States or the Federal Government. ' 55 On the other hand, he ar-
0 Id. at 440 (emphasis added). Leslie Dunbar comments, "[Tlhe practical effect of
enumeration is the enlistment of the protection of positive law, spoken through the courts,
for rights which otherwise could be defended only through political action." Dunbar, supra
note 38, at 643.
" U.S. CONST. art III, sec. 2.
12 "Had Congress engaged in the extraordinary occupation of improving the constitu-
tions of the several states by affording the people additional protection from the exercise
of power by their own governments in matters which concerned themselves alone, they
would have declared this purpose in plain and intelligible language." Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833). See text accompanying notes 117-18 infra.
s See note 39 supra.
s See Dunbar, supra note 38, at 641. See also Redlich, supra note 36, at 807 (quoted at
text accompanying note 103 infra); note 46 supra.
3- 381 U.S. at 492 (concurring opinion).
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gues that "the Ninth Amendment is relevant in a case dealing
with a State's infringement of a fundamental right. While the
Ninth Amendment-and indeed the entire Bill of Rights-
originally concerned restrictions upon federal power, the sub-
sequently enacted Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States as
well from infringing fundamental personal liberties." 56 Justice
Goldberg goes on to explain that
the Ninth Amendment, in indicating that not all such liberties
are specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments, is
surely relevant in showing the existence of other fundamental
personal rights, now protected from state, as well as federal, in-
fringement. In sum, the Ninth Amendment simply lends strong
support to the view that the "liberty" protected by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments from infringement by the Federal
Government or the States is not restricted to rights specifically
mentioned in the first eight amendments. 57
Justice Goldberg leaps too lightly from the "existence of
rights" retained by the people to a federal power to protect them.
That no such power was conferred is disclosed by Madison's dis-
avowal of any implication that the enumerated rights were "as-
signed into the hands of the General Government," least of all for
diminution of States' rights, his affirmation that there was no in-
tention to enlarge but rather to limit the delegated powers, and
his demarcation of "cases in which the Government ought not to
act." 58
Goldberg's appeal to the "liberty" of the fifth amendment's
due process clause for authority to "protect" the unspecified
rights retained by the people under the ninth amendment implies
that what the ninth plainly withheld was conferred under the rose
by the fifth. But why should the Founders take pains to exclude
federal power with regard to the unenumerated right of the ninth
if they were simultaneously conferring it sub silentio by the fifth?
That is inexplicable. In fact, the Founders fenced off "cases in
which the Government ought not to act," and it requires evidence
that those fences were torn down by the fifth. Then too, the "lib-
erty" of the fifth amendment on which Goldberg relies referred
56 Id. at 493.
, Id. (emphasis added).
s See text accompanying notes 44, 46, & 47.
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to freedom from imprisonment and freedom of locomotion, 59
which with fine casuistry the Court, overturning a maximum
hours law in Lochner v. New York, 60 perverted into "liberty of
contract"-the "liberty" of a bakery worker to contract for sixty
hours of labor a week. Notwithstanding his caustic dissent in
Lochner, Justice Holmes later drew on this "liberty" for a better
cause: free speech "must be taken to be included in the Four-
teenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has been given to the
word 'liberty.' ",61 Thus "liberty" has been expanded in our own
time from a shrivelled root. Then too, the due process clause of
the fifth amendment was meant only to protect against depriva-
tion of "liberty" without judicial proceedings, not to endow the
courts with visitorial powers over legislation. 62 Not a glimmer of
intention exists in the history of the fourteenth amendment to
alter that meaning and deliver the last word on state legislation to
federal judges.63 James Wilson, chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee during the fourteenth amendment debates, indicated
that the due process clause furnished a "remedy" to secure the
"fundamental rights" enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of
1866 6 4-a law considered by the framers to be "exactly" like the
fourteenth amendment. 65 .Those "fundamental rights" are far
11 See Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in those Clauses in the Federal and
State Constitutions Which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property," 4 HARV. L. REv. 365 (1891);
Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431, 442-45
(1926). See generally R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 270 (1977).
Blackstone defined "the personal liberty of individuals" as consisting "in the power of
locomotion ... or moving one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may di-
rect, without imprisonment of restraint, unless by due course of law." 2 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *134. During the debates about the fourteenth amendment, James Wilson
read Blackstone to the House. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1118 (1866).
60 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
61 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J. dissenting) (emphasis
added).
62 On the eve of the Federal Convention, Hamilton stated in the New York assembly:
"The words "due process" have a precise technical import, and are only applicable to the
process and proceedings of the courts of justice; they can never be referred to an act of
legislature." 4 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (Syrett and Cooke eds. 1962). He sum-
marized 400 years of history. See Berger, "Law of the Land" Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U. L. REv.
1 (1979).
63 See BERGER, supra note 59, at 201-06. See also Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Al-
lure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 416 (1978).
4 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1294-95 (1866).
65 See R. BERGER, supra note 59, at 22-23. Justice Bradley declared: "[T]he civil rights
bill was enacted at the same session, and but shortly before the presentation of the four-
teenth amendment; ... [it] was in pari materia; and was probably intended to reach the
same object ... [Tihe first section of the bill covers the same ground as the fourteenth
amendment." Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-stock Landing &
Slaughterhouse Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 655 (C.C. La. 1870) (No. 8,408).
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removed from Goldberg's ambitious catalog. In the words of the
draftsman of the Act, Senator Lyman Trumbull, chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, they were "the right to acquire prop-
erty, the rights to go and come at pleasure [freedom of
locomotion], the right to enforce rights in the courts, [and] to
make contracts .... ,,66 It took the wonder-working Warren Court
to transform the fourteenth amendment into a cornucopia of
"rights" excluded by the framers.67
Possibly I do not appreciate the subtle differentiation between
"incorporation" of the ninth amendment in the fourteenth and
enforcement of the unspecified rights "retained" under the ninth
by resort to the "liberty" of the fourteenth, but to my mind the
distinction is purely semantic. Let me therefore reiterate that the
argument that the Bill of Rights was incorporated in the four-
teenth amendment is without historical warrant, as Charles Fair-
man demonstrated, and as is widely acknowledged. 8 Since it
66 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866). This was a paraphrase of the terms of
the Civil Rights Bill. See R. BERGER, supra note 59, at 24.
6 See R. BERGER, supra note 59, at 52-68, 117-33. See also, Berger, supra note 42, at
793-94. Senator William Fessenden, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction
of both Houses, stated, "[wie cannot put into the Constitution, owing to existing prejudices
and existing institutions, an entire exclusion of all class distinctions .. " CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 705 (1866). Time and again attempts to ban all discriminations were
defeated. See R. BERGER, supra note 59, at 163-64.
68 See Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L.
REv. 5 (1949); Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN.
L. REv. 140 (1949). See also R. BERGER, supra note 59, at 137; A. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 102 (1962).
Professor Dean Alfange, an activist, wrote, "it is all but certain that the Fourteenth
Amendment was not intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights and thus to revolutionize
the administration of criminal justice in the states." Alfange, supra note 42, at 607. Profes-
sor Charles E. Merriam noted that the Founders believed government must be limited in
many ways:
it must be checked at every possible point; it must be at all times under suspi-
cion .... Too much emphasis cannot well be laid upon the fear which the
'Fathers' had of government. To them the great lesson of history was, that
government always tends to become oppressive, and it was the greatest foe of
individual liberty.
C. MERRIAM, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES 76-77 (1903). Let one bit of
contemporary evidence suffice. The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, drafted by Jefferson,
stated that "limited constitutions [are designed] to bind down those whom we are obliged
to trust with power," to bind them "down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution."
4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 31, at 543.
Professor Philip Kurland wrote of the Court's decisions that the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment made the religion clauses of the first amendment applicable to
the states: "Of course, nothing in the history of- the fourteenth amendment suggests that
this was among its purposes or goals. The transmogrification occurred soley at the whim
of the Court. An attempt to pass a constitutional amendment providing for the application
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must draw upon the due process clause,69 and since "due process"
in the fifth and fourteenth amendments is identical, the argument
makes nonsense of the Bill of Rights. For incorporation of the
"first eight" amendments into the "due process" of the fifth ren-
ders all the rest superfluous. The framers' attachment to state
sovereignty70 led the 39th Congress to limit federal intrusion to
the ban on discrimination with respect to the "fundamental
rights" enumerated by Trumbull.7 1 In particular, Chairman Wil-
son emphasized, "[we are not making a general criminal code for
the States." 72 The last thing the framers had in mind was to vest
the distrusted judiciary 73 with the power of controlling state ad-
ministration of local matters. Thus, the Court's long journey from
the fifth amendment through the fourteenth to the ninth
amendment exemplifies the unremitting expansion of judicial
usurpation, from what is first disputed to what becomes Holy
Writ and is then further dilated.74 In a crowning irony, Justice
Black, who fathered the "incorporation" doctrine, at last cried
"halt":
[Flor a period of a century and a half no serious suggestion was
ever made that the Ninth Amendment, enacted to protect state
powers against federal invasion, could be used as a weapon of
federal power to prevent state legislatures from passing laws
they consider appropriate to govern local affairs. Use of any
such broad, unbounded judicial authority would make of this
Court's members a day-to-day constitutional convention. 75
This is not, as Justice Goldberg argued, "to give ... [the
ninth amendment] no effect whatsoever." 76  Ample effect, over-
of the religion clauses to the states, the Blaine amendment, failed in 1876, eight years after
effectuation of the fourteenth amendment." Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. Rav. 3, 9-10 (1978)
(citations omitted).
69 R. BERGER, supra note 59, at 139-41.
70 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 358 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Conkling); id. at
1292-93 (remarks of Rep. Bingham). See generally, R. BERGER, supra note 59, at 60-64.
71 See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
72 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1120 (1866).
73 See R. BERGER, supra note 59, at 222-23; Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light
From the Fifteenth, 74 Nw.U. L. REv. 311, 350-51 (1979).
"" Thus the Court has fulfilled the colonists' fear of power's "endlessly propulsive ten-
dency to expand itself beyond legitimate boundaries." B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORI-
GINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 56 (1967).
75 381 U.S. at 520 (Black, J., dissenting). See also note 52 supra.
76 381 U.S. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring). In this error Goldberg had been antici-
pated by Patterson. See B. PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 24.
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looked by Goldberg, was commonsensically furnished by Dean
Roscoe Pound: "Those [rights] not expressly set forth are not
forever excluded but are, if the Ninth Amendment is read with
the Tenth, left to be secured by the states or by the people of the
whole land by constitutional change, as was done, for example, by
the Fourteenth Amendment." 77  In "retaining" the unenumerated
rights, the people reserved to themselves power to add to or sub-
tract from the rights enumerated in the Constitution by the proc-
ess of amendment exclusively confided to them by article V. If
this be deemed supererogatory, be it remembered that according
to Madison the ninth amendment itself was "inserted merely for
greater caution."
Bennett Patterson
It is tempting to dismiss Patterson's The Forgotten Ninth
Amendment out of hand. 78 But the fact that it has Roscoe Pound's
encomium 79-although his own conclusions were diametrically
opposed to those of Patterson-and that it has been cited by
others80 calls for more considered judgment.8 I Although more
than half of Patterson's 217 pages are devoted to a reprint of the
debates in the First Congress on the Bill of Rights, he gleans little
therefrom. He mentions Gerry's unsuccessful proposal to change
the word "disparage" in the ninth to "impair"; 82 and sets out the
"last clause of Madison's fourth resolution,"
77 Pound, Foreword to B. PATTERSON, supra note I, at iv. Pound reiterated: "[These
reserved rights may be defined and enforcement of them may be provided by the states,
except as may be precluded by the Fourteenth Amendment, or may be defined and ac-
quire secured enforcement by the people of the United States by constitutional amend-
ment." Id. at vi.
78 Patterson's unreliability may be quickly illustrated. He states:
"We believe that the law should grow and our Constitution should be inter-
preted in the light of current history, as was stated by one of the eminent
courts of last resort of one of the States, [quoting] 'The law should be con-
strued in reference to the habits of business prevalent in the country at the time
it was enacted. The law ... as then known to exist.' "
Id. at 56 (emphasis added). Patently, the case expresses exactly the opposite of Patterson's
proposition that "the law should grow."
7' Pound, Foreword to B. PATTERSON, supra note 1, at vi-vii.
80 See, e.g., 381 U.S. at 490 n.9 (Goldberg, J. concurring); E. DuMBAULD, supra note 38,
at 138; Redlich, supra note 36, at 805 n.87.
81 "The flaccid acceptance of shoddy work ha[s] long been a scandal of scholarly and
literary journals." 0. HANDLIN, TRUTH IN HISTORY 149 (1973).
82 B. PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 16.
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The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in
favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to di-
minish the just importance of other rights retained by the
people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitu-
tion; but either as actual limitations of such power, or as in-
serted merely for greater caution.8 3
Instead of noticing this disclaimer of intention "to enlarge," but
rather to impose "actual limitations" on the powers "delegated by
the Constitution," Patterson seizes on the words "the exceptions
here or elsewhere in the Constitution." 84 From this he concludes
that the language "definitely demonstrates that the clause was in-
tended as a general declaration of human rights ... a general
clause relating to the entire Constitution, and not a specific clause
relating only to the proposed amendments." 85 Without doubt it
"related to any other rights enumerated ... in the Constitution," 86
but it is a nonsequitur to conclude that these words constitute "a
general declaration of human rights." The specific is not the
''general."
Patterson also construes a proposed Senate preamble to the
Bill of Rights recognizing state desires to "prevent misconstruction
or abuse of [the granted] powers" by adding "further declaratory
and restrictive clauses" 87 to mean that the ninth and tenth
amendments are a "declaration of principles" rather than "restric-
tive clauses." 88 The word "declaratory" means to declare the law
or rights as they stand, rather than a "declaration" of new law or
rights. 89 Thus, the Framers regarded the proposed amendments
as merely declaring what was implicit: unenumerated powers are
not granted. °
a See text accompanying note 47 supra.
84 B. PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 13. He also set forth Madison's response to the "as-
signment" objection to a Bill of Rights, see text accompanying note 44 supra, without com-
ment on its significance.
85 B. PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 13 (emphasis added).
86 Id. (emphasis added).
87 Id. at 17.
86 Id. at 18.
88 So far as the amendments were not "actual ]imitations," said Madison, they were
"inserted merely for greater caution." See text accompanying note 47 supra. See also text
accompanying note 41 supra.
9' See notes 42, 43 supra. Justice Stone stated that the tenth "amendment states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered." It was merely "declaratory" of
the existing relationship between state and federal governments; its purpose was to "allay
fears that the new federal government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that
the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers." United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100,. 124 (1941).
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True it is that the Constitution is not to "be construed as a
grant to the individual of inherent rights or liberties;" 91 rather, as
Hamilton said of a "declaration of rights," it is a "limitation ... of
the power of the government itself." 92 But it was the federal
government, not the states, that was so limited.9 3 Patterson finds
it "impossible to believe that human rights and individual liber-
ties" had been fought for "only to be surrendered up to State
governments where they could be destroyed by the sovereign
people acting en masse." 9 4 He forgets that the Bill of Rights is-
sued out of state distrust of the powers of the general govern-
ment. "In an age where men looked to the states as the chief
guardians of individual rights," Professor Redlich observed, "it
was not surprising that the barrier of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments was erected against only the federal government."9 5
Patterson would fetter the "sovereign people" themselves, al-
though the ninth amendment provides that unenumerated rights
are "retained by the people," not by some superior body that will
protect against them.
The bulk of Patterson's discussion is beside the point-a sus-
tained panegyric to "inherent natural rights of the individual." 96
91 B. PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 19 (emphasis added).
92 THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton) at 558 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
93 It needs constantly to be remembered that
the sovereign powers vested in the State governments, by their respective con-
stitutions, remained unaltered and unimpaired, except so far as they were
granted to the government of the United States.
The government, then, of the United States, can claim no powers which
are not granted to it by the constitution, and the powers actually granted, must
be such as are expressly given, or given by necessary implication.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 325-26 (1816) (Story, J.).
91 B. PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 36-37.
"5 Redlich, supra note 36, at 808. See note 22 supra. Patterson infers from the statement
in Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31, 34 (1890), that "the first
eight articles of the amendments to the Constitution have reference to powers exercised by
the government of the United States and not to those of the States," that the ninth
amendment did not contain such limitation. B. PATTERSON, supra note 1, at 28 (emphasis
added). Eilenbecker considered challenges under the fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments,
and the Court had no occasion to wander beyond the first eight. In addition, it was the
"exercise," not the "reservation" of rights or powers that was at issue. It would take more
than Eilenbecker to translate the ninth's retention of rights by the states or the people into
limits upon the states, let alone that history precludes the Patterson differentiation.
96 B. Patterson, supra note 1, at 19. Throughout he exalts the status of the individual
over the collective. But to the Revolutionists of 1776, "individual rights, even the basic civil
liberties that we consider so crucial, possessed little of their modern theoretical relevance
when set against the will of the people." G. WOOD, supra note 38, at 63.
The individual with whom Patterson, a member of a Houston law firm, B. PATTERSON,
supra note 1, at 99, was concerned is the capitalist, who must be shielded from the "senti-
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Be they as wide as all outdoors, 97 he assumes rather than proves
that the enforcement of unenumerated rights "retained by the
people" was handed over to the General Government by the ninth
amendment. His insistence that "[t]here is no provision in the
Constitution which shall prevent the Government of the United
States from protecting inherent rights" g overlooks the elemen-
tary fact that the federal government has only such powers as are
granted. 9  His is the error in rejecting the proposition that "in
order to protect a native human or inherent right, we must find
the source of its protection in the Constitution." 100
Professor Norman Redlich
More sophisticated than Patterson, Professor Redlich appre-
ciates the import of the legislative history: "the sketchy legislative
history would seem to support the holding in Barron v. Baltimore
that it was intended to restrict only the federal government." 101
He considers that "[i]t would be unrealistic to attribute to the Sen-"
ate," which had added to the tenth amendment the words "or to
the people," and "intent to impose ill-defined legally enforceable
restraints on the states." 102 Those
last four words of the Tenth Amendment must have been
added to conform its meaning to the Ninth Amendment and to
carry out the intent of both-that as to the federal government
there were rights, not enumerated in the Constitution, which
were 'retained ... by the people,' and that because the people
mental over-generosity and assistance that will in short time weaken our people by doing
for them the things which they should be able and willing to do for themselves, and thus
stifle genius and destroy their stamina."
"[S]ome of us," he counsels, "will have greater material wealth than others and none of
our people can permit themselves to rankle and become bitter, because it is a part of our
system to believe in private ownership of property." Id. at 84.
97 The sovereign people's power to create "rights" knows no bounds: "The other rights
'retained by the people' may be, of course, justified by derivation from natural law theory;
but they could just as well be ascribed ... to the consensus of the American people."
Dunbar, supra note 38, at 640.
9' B. PArERsON, supra note 1, at 42.
" See notes 43, 93 supra.
100 B. PATrERSON, supra note 1, at 45. Like Patterson, Knowlton Kelsey jumps to his
conclusion without prior demonstration that it is compelled by text or history: "[The ninth]
must be a positive declaration of existing, though unnamed rights, which may be vindi-
cated under the authority of the Amendment whenever and if ever any governmental
authority shall aspire to ungranted power in contravention of 'unenumerated rights.'"
Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L.J. 309, 323 (1936).
"' Redlich, supra note 36, at 805-06 (footnote omitted).
102 Id. at 806.
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possessed such rights there were powers which neither the fed-
eral government nor the States possessed.103
These remarks, plus his observation that the Founders "looked to
the states as the chief guardians of individual rights" and con-
sequently that the "barrier of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
was erected against only the federal government," 104 require the
conclusion that the ninth amendment has no application to the
states. It is therefore puzzling to read that the ninth and tenth
amendments "might be peculiarly suited to meet the unique and
important problems suggested by the Connecticut birth control
law case." 105
The starting point for Redlich is a "strong historical argu-
ment" that the ninth and tenth amendments "were intended to
apply in a situation where the asserted right appears to the Court
as fundamental to a free society but is, nevertheless, not specified
in the Bill of Rights." 106 Apparently Redlich assumes that the
Court is to be the enforcer of these "not specified" rights.'0 7 That
role apparently is premised in his statement that the ninth and
tenth amendments "appear to have been designed" for "the pro-
tection of individual rights not specified in the Constitution." 108
But it is incompatible with his statement that "because the people
possessed such [retained] rights, there were powers which neither
the federal government nor the States possessed." "09 Among such
"no-powers" is the "protection" of those retained rights.
Anticipating Justice Goldberg, Redlich attempts to bridge this
chasm by invoking the fourteenth amendment to provide "the
framework for applying these restrictions against the states, even
though they may have been originally intended to apply only
against the United States." 110 First, he suggests that those Justices
''who consider the Fourteenth Amendment as having embodied
either or all the major portions of the Bill of Rights could ap-
103 Id. at 807 (emphasis added). For present purposes there is no need to inquire
whether the reservation of powers not delegated to the federal government also operates
against the states. The Founders feared federal, not state power, as Redlich himself recog-
nizes. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
104 Redlich, supra note 36, at 808.
105 Id. at 804.
106 Id. at 808.
107 It is not only such judicially recognized "fundamental" rights, but all unenumerated
rights which are "retained by the people."
108 Redlich, supra note 36, at 808.
109 Id. at 807 (emphasis added).
1 Id. at 806.
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propriately consider the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as 'incor-
porated' or 'absorbed' into the first paragraph of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 111 Thus the discredited "incorporation" doctrine is
to serve as the vehicle of yet another arrogation, a result on which
even the apostle of "incorporation," Justice Black, gagged. Redlich
would have the tenth amendment, which reserves powers not del-
egated, and against which all "general" delegations are to be read,
swallowed up by the fourteenth! 112 Next, Redlich turns to "those
Justices who have viewed the Fourteenth Amendment as limited
only to 'fundamental' rights unrelated to the specific provisions of
the Bill of Rights [who] should have no difficulty in adopting a
Constitutional provision which appears to have been almost
custom-made for this approach." 113 This collides with his conclu-
sion that the retention of rights was accompanied by the withhold-
ing of correlative power.
John Hart Ely
Stamping Chief Justice Warren's holding in Boling v. Sharpe
"that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment incorpo-
rates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"
as "gibberish both syntactically and historically," 114 Professor John
Hart Ely turns to the ninth amendment, asserting that "such an
open-ended provision is appropriately read to include an 'equal
protection' component." 115 Indeed, he considers that "the conclu-
sion that the Ninth Amendment was intended to signal the exis-
tence of federal constitutional rights beyond those specifically
enumerated in the Constitution is the only conclusion its language
seems comfortably able to support." 116
If I do not mistake his meaning, Ely confines his invocation
of the ninth amendment to the federal domain. We are agreed
11 Id. at 808.
112 Senator Frederick Frelinghuysen, a framer who construed the fourteenth amend-
ment broadly, said in 1871 that "the Fourteenth Amendment must.., not be used to make
the General Government imperial. It must be read ... together with the Tenth Amend-
ment." CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 501 (1871). In a more innocent decade (1957),
Professor Dumbauld wrote, "The Ninth and Tenth Amendments, being reservations for
the benefit of the states, of course give no occasion for raising the question whether they
are made applicable against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment." E. DUMBAULD,
supra note 38, at 138.
113 Redlich, supra note 36, at 808.
"I J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 32 (1980).
115 Id. at 33.
116 Id. at 38.
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that "[ilt is quite clear that the original framers and ratifying con-
ventions intended the Bill of Rights to control only the actions of
the federal government." 117 It therefore bears emphasis that
Ely's "federal constitutional rights" can be asserted only against
the federal government and not the states, for he does not here
call on incorporation into the fourteenth amendment.
Ely's reference to the "existence of federal constitutional
rights" requires explication. Both the rights expressed in the Bill
of Rights and the unspecified rights retained by the people
"exist," but only the former are "constitutional rights." To my
mind, a right "retained" by the people and not described has not
been embodied in the Constitution. Madison made clear that the
retained rights were not "assigned" to the federal government: to
the contrary, he emphasized that they constitute an area in which
the "Government ought not to act." This means, in my judgment,
that the courts have not been empowered to enforce the retained
rights against either the federal government or the states.
Ely himself observes, "One thing we know to a certainty from
the historical context is that the Ninth Amendment was not de-
signed to grant Congress authority to create additional rights, to
amend Article I, Section 8 by adding a general power to protect
rights."118 Without protection, a "right" is empty. And he justly
points out that the phrase " 'others retained by the people' [is not]
an apt way of saying 'others Congress may create.' "I1 That
power of creation equally was withheld from the courts; the
Founders did not regard the courts as "creators", or lawmakers,
but as discoverers of law. 20 For them, the separation of powers,
as Madison said in the First Congress, was a "sacred principle" 121
reinforced by a "profound fear" of judicial discretion.1 22 It does
not, therefore, advance the case for judicial enforcement of the
ninth amendment that "[t]here was at the time of the original
Constitution little legislative history indicating that any particular
"17 Id. at 37.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 "[J]udges conceived of their role as merely that of discovering and applying preexist-
ing legal rules." Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of American Law 1780-
1820, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 287, 297 (1971).
121 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 28, at 596-97 (Gerry referring to Madison's argu-
ment).
122 G. WOOD, supra note 38, at 298. In 1769 Chief Justice Hutchinson of Massachusetts
declared: "the judge should never be the Legislator: Because, then the will of the Judge
would be the Law: and this tends to a State of Slavery." Horwitz, supra note 120, at 292.
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provision was to receive judicial enforcement: the Ninth Amend-
ment was not singled out one way or the other." 123 All the pre-
suppositions the Founders brought to the task militate against a
blank check to that branch which Hamilton assured them "was
next to nothing." 124 Ely himself remarks that "read for what it
says the Ninth Amendment seems open-textured enough to sup-
port almost anything one might wish to argue, and that thought
can get pretty scary." 125 "[T]hat thought," I venture, would have
scared the Founders out of their wits. It runs against Madison's
explanation that the Bill of Rights would impel the judiciary "to
resist encroachments upon rights expressly stipulated for ... by
the declaration of rights," 126 and reinforces the conclusion that
courts were not empowered to enforce the retained and unenum-
erated rights.
Ely finds Madison's explanation of the ninth amendment
separating "the question of unenumerated powers from the ques-
tion of unenumerated rights" 127 confused: "the possibility that
unenumerated rights will be disparaged is seemingly made to do
service as an intermediate premise in an argument that unenum-
.erated powers will be implied ... ." 128 This "confusion" he attri-
butes to "what we today would regard as a category mistake, a
failure to recognize that rights and powers are not simply the ab-
sence of one another but that rights can cut across or 'trump'
powers." 129 But whether the Founders were mistaken in logic is
123 J. ELY, supra note 114, at 40.
124 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton) at n.* (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937) (quoting C.
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (1748)). See also J. WILSON, supra note 21.
125 J. ELY, supra note 114, at 34.
126 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 28, at 457 (quoted at text accompanying note 50
supra).
127 J. ELY, supra note 114, at 35.
128 Id. at 36.
129 Id. Citing Hamilton's reply to the argument that the power of taxation could be used.
to inhibit freedom of expression, THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton) 560 n.* (Mod. Lib.
ed. 1937), Ely concludes that "the possibility of a governmental act's being supported by
one of the enumerated powers and at the same time violating one of the enumerated
rights is one our forebears were capable of contemplating." J. ELY, supra note 114, at 202
n.86. Hamilton rejected the notion that "the imposition of duties upon publications" would
be impeded by express "declarations in the State constitutions, in favor of the freedom of
the press." He argued in support of his conclusion "that newspapers are taxed in Great
Britain and yet it is notorious that the press nowhere enjoys greater liberty than in that
country." THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton) 560 n.* (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
Whether an enumerated power might override an "exception" in favor of an enumerated
right need not presently concern us, although it is worth noting Madison's emphasis that
enumerated rights were "excepted" "out of the grant of power"-that they were to be re-
garded "as actual limitations of such powers." Here the issue is whether there is an "unex-
pressed power" to enforce unenumerated rights "retained by the people."
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of no moment if they acted on that mistaken view. 130 That the
Framers premised that rights and powers were two sides of the
same coin is hardly disputable. The exceptions "made in favor of
particular rights," Madison stated, were to be regarded as "actual
limitations on such powers."131 The "great object" of a Bill of
Rights, he said, was to limit ... the powers of Government, by ex-
cepting out of the grant of power those cases in which the Gov-
ernment ought not to act, or could act only in a particular
mode." 132 As Ely observes, "[w]hat is important" is that Madison
"wished to forestall both the implication of unexpressed powers
and the disparagement of unenumerated rights," employing the
tenth amendment for the one and the ninth for the other. 33 By
what logic do we derive "unexpressed powers" to enforce "un-
enumerated rights" in the teeth of Madison's purpose to "fore-
close ... the implication of unexpressed powers," and his em-
phasis that the enumeration of "particular rights" was not to be
construed to "enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution,"
but rather "as actual limitations of such powers"? 134 Is it conceiv-
able that Madison meant to confer "open-ended" power by "un-
enumerated rights" while limiting power by the enumeration of
"particular rights"? Ely's conclusion also collides with his affirma-
tion that the ninth amendment was not designed to add to article
I, section eight "a general power to protect rights."
Finally Ely concludes, "[i]f a principled approach to judicial
enforcement of ... open ended provisions cannot be developed,
one that is not hopelessly inconsistent with our nation's commit-
ment to representative democracy, responsible commentators
must consider seriously the possibility that courts simply should
stay away from them." 135 The notion that the Framers, so fearful
of the greedy expansiveness of power, 136 would make an "open-
ended," i.e. unlimited, grant, which after the lapse of almost two
hundred years is so "scary" that Ely would condemn it unless lim-
130 C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 186 (1928).
131 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra nole 28, at 435 (quoted at text accompanying note 47
supra) (emphasis added).
132 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 28, at 437 (quoted at text accompanying note 46
supra) (emphasis added). See also 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 22, at 256 (remarks of Rep.
Pinckney) (quoted at note 39 supra).
133 J. ELY, supra note 114, at 36.
134 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 28, at 435 (quoted at text accompanying note 47
supra).
135 J. ELY, supra note 114, at 41.
136 See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
-~~~~~~~ " . -. ,_ .- .-. ,;..< 71 .-
[Vol. 66:1
1980] NINTH AMENDMENT 23
ited by a "principled" approach, verges on the "incredible." 1
Little less strange is the assumption that a Court which employed
the allegedly "open-ended" terms of the fourteenth amend-
ment 138 in disregard of the framers' unmistakable intention to
exclude suffrage from its scope 139 will show greater respect for
the self-denying "principles" which Ely now proffers.
CONCLUSION
The ninth amendment demonstrably was not custom-made to
enlarge federal enforcement of "fundamental rights" in spite of
state law; it was merely declaratory of a basic presupposition: all
powers not "positively" granted are reserved to the people. It
added no unspecified rights to the Bill of Rights; instead it de-
marked an area in which the "General Government" has no
power whatsoever. To transform it into an instrument of control
137 I borrow the pejorative from Ely's description of my views. See J. ELY, supra note 114
at 198 n.66.
131 For a critique of this theory, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: TH!E TRANS-
FORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 300-11 (1977). Ely has it that the framers of
the fourteenth amendment issued "open and across-the-board invitations to import into the
constitutional decision process considerations that will not be found in the amendment nor
even ... elsewhere in the Constitution." Ely, supra note 63, at 415 (emphasis added). For a
critique of this view, see Berger, Government by Judiciary: John Hart Ely's "Invitation," 54 IND.
L.J. 277 (1979).
The claim that the 1789 framers issued such an "invitation" through the medium of
"open-ended" terms runs counter to Ely's own analysis. He remarks that the founders
"certainly didn't have natural law in mind when the Constitution's various open-ended
delegations to the future were inserted and approved." J. ELY, supra note 114, at 39. He
notes that "you can invoke natural law to support anything you want." Id. at 50. His
"open-ended" theory would permit the imposition of personal, extra-constitutional values
that found no favor in the shape of natural law.
The founders, as Professor Philip Kurland observed, and as is well attested, were at-
tached to a "written Constitution" -one of "fixed and unchanging meaning," except as
changed by amendment. P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1978). They
conceived the judge's role as policing constitutional boundaries, not as taking over legislative
functions within those boundaries, and still less as revision of the Constitution. See Berger,
Government by Judiciary: John Hart Ely's "Invitation," supra, at 287. As Elbridge Gerry stated,
"lilt was quite foreign from the nature of [the) office to make them judges of the policy of
public measures." 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 22, at 97-98. See 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 22,
at 75. "Vague and uncertain laws, and more especially Constitutions," wrote Samuel
Adams, "are the very instruments of slavery." 3 S. ADAMS, WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 262
(H. Cushing ed. 1904) (quoted in Berger, Government by Judiciary: John Hart Ely's "Invitation,"
supra, at 288).
Such were the presuppositions that underlie Madison's reference to judicial protection
of "stipulated rights." Ely's acknowledgment that the ninth amendment did not empower
Congress to "create" additional rights, or add "a general power to protect rights" is at war
with his view that the amendment is "open-ended."
13' See notes 144, 145, and accompanying text infra.
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over state government by recourse to the fourteenth amendment
blatantly perverts the meaning of the framers, both in 1789 and
in 1866.
The newly discovered "meaning" of the ninth amendment is
but another facet of the unremitting effort to rationalize the judi-
cial take-over of government in areas which have found favor
with activists. It was not ever thus. The shift has been described
by an activist, Professor Stanley Kutler: through the late 1930s,
academe "criticized vigorously the abusive powers of the federal
judiciary" for "frustrating desirable social policies" and "arrogat-
[ing] a policymaking function not conferred upon them by the
Constitution."140 After 1937, these critics "suddenly found a new
faith," a "new libertarianism promoting 'preferred freedoms' "
protected by an "activist judiciary." 141 Now another activist, Pro-
fessor Louis Lusky, defends "the Court's new and grander con-
ception of its own place in the governmental scheme" 142 resting
on "basic shifts in its approach to constitutional adjudication
[including] ... assertion of the power to revise the Constitution,
bypassing the cumbersome amendment procedure prescribed by
article V." 143 That "new and grander" role-conferred by the
Court on the Court-pays little heed to the intention of the
Framers. When confronted by Justice Harlan's "irrefutable" dem-
onstration that the fourteenth amendment was not intended to
"authorize Congress to set voter qualifications" 144 -it is safe to
say that suffrage was unmistakably excluded 14 5 -Justices Brennan,
White and Marshall "could not accept this thesis even if it were
supported by historical evidence," 146 and Justice Douglas dis-
missed it as "irrelevant." 147 This repudiated the traditional canon
140 Kutler, Raoul Berger's Fourteenth Amendment: A History or Ahistorical?, 6 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 511-12 (1979).
141 Id. at 513.
142 Lusky, "Government by Judiciary": What Price Legitimacy?, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 403,
408 (1979).
... Id. at 406 (emphasis added).
1' Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 350 (1970).
145 Looking back in Griswold, Justice Harlan justly remarked that the reapportionment
interpretations were "made in the face of irrefutable and still unanswered history to the
contrary." 381 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring). See R. BERGER, supra note 59, at 52-98.
Lusky considers that Harlan's demonstration is "irrefutable and unrefuted." Lusky, supra
note 142, at 406. See generally Berger, supra note 42, at 794.
146 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 251 (1970).
147 Id. at 140. Little wonder that Professor Paul Brest challenges the assumption "that
judges and other public officials were bound by the text or original understanding of the
Constitution." Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. Rev.
204, 224 (1980).
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of construction reiterated by Justice Holmes: when a legislature "has
intimated its will, however indirectly, that will should be recog-
nized and obeyed .... [I]t is not an adequate discharge of duty for
courts to say: We see what you are driving at, but you have not
said it." 148 Still less is that will to be disobeyed when the Framers
have spoken with unmistakable clarity, any more than the Court
may "revise" the express text. Posterity will honor Justice Harlan's
comment:
When the Court disregards the express intent and understand-
ing of the Framers, it has invaded the realm of the political
process to which the amending power was committed, and it
has violated the constitutional structure which it is its highest
duty to protect.14 9
Even the express text is thrust aside by one super-heated
activist, Professor Robert Cover:
[A] reading of the Constitution must stand or fall not upon the
Constitution's self-evident meaning, nor upon the intentions of
the 1787 or 1866 framers ... [it is for us, not the framers, to
decide whether that end of liberty is best served by entrusting to
judges a major role in defining our governing political ideas
and in measuring the activity of the primary actors in majorita-
rian politics against that ideology. 150
Of course Cover does not-and cannot-point to the source of
this decision to "entrust" judges with the ultimate power to frame
our "ideology"; he chooses instead to equate the wishes of the
academic illuminati with the will of "We, the people." Widespread
resistance to busing, as well as dissatisfaction with affirmative ac-
tion, the Court's restrictions on death penalties, and State criminal
law enforcement testify that the identification is imaginary. Were
148 Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908) (quoted in Keifer & Keifer v.
R.F.C., 306 U.S. 381, 391 n.4 (1939)). Judge Learned Hand stated in 1959 that "the pur-
pose may be so manifest as to override even the explicit words used." Cawley v. United
States, 272 F.2d 443, 445 (2d Cir. 1959). "The intention of the lawmaker is the law."
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903) (quoting Smythe v. Fiske, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.)
374, 380 (1874)). Those who dismiss out of hand the application of canons of statutory
construction to constitutional interpretation are probably unaware that Justice Story, Ed-
ward Corwin, Julius Goebel and Harry Jones are to the contrary. See Berger, supra note
42, at 805.
149 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
140 Cover, Book Review, NEw REPUBuC, Jan. 14, 1978, at 27 (emphasis added). See also
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 224 (1980).
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the values of thejustices superior to those of the commonality,1 51
they would yet represent those of "Big Brother" and recall
Robespierre: "If Frenchmen would not be free and virtuous vol-
untarily, then he would force them to be free and cram virtue
down their throats." 152
It is against this background that the Goldbergian resort to
the ninth amendment is to be viewed; another bit of legal
legerdemain whose purpose is to take from the people their right
to self-government and put it in the hands of the Justices.' 5 3
151 Professor G. Edward White asks, "[W]hy should [the Court] not openly acknowledge
that the source of [newly-invented] rights is not the constitutional text but the enhanced
seriousness of certain values in American society?" White, Reflections on the role of the Sup-
reme Court: the Contemporary Debate and the "Lessons" of History, 63 JUDICATURE 162, 168
(1979). See also Forrester, Are We Ready for Truth in Judging?, 63 A.B.A.J. 1212 (1977).
152 2 C. BRINTON, J. CHRISTOPER & R. WOLFF, A HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION 115 (1st ed.
1955).
153 Alfred Kelly, a devout activist, wrote that the Warren Court was "apparent[ly] deter-
min[ed] to carry through a constitutional ... revolution." Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit
Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 119, 158.
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